The petitioner is a Somali who had refugee status and was convicted of a felony, aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs.  He pled guilty.  The record reflects that counsel informed the trial court that he had explained the possible immigration consequences of the conviction to his client, and the court also inquired on the record whether he understood these consequences, which he said he did.  After the petitioner had served his sentence and paid his fine, he received a notice to appear before an immigration judge and was informed that he was subject to removal, although he was not deported.

While he was in Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the petitioner moved for a new trial under M.R.Crim.P. 33 and asserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.  He also invoked Rules 1 and 2 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The defendant argued that, after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), he was entitled to raise these issues through a motion for new trial.  The Superior Court disagreed and denied his motion.

The Law Court affirmed.  It reviewed the two Ngo cases, in which another immigrant’s motion to vacate his convictions in a later petition for ineffective assistance of counsel were denied.  In the first Ngo case, the Court concluded that the only basis for relief was post-conviction review.  However, when Mr. Ngo brought his petition for post-conviction review, the Law Court held that he could not demonstrate a present restraint or impediment because of the civil nature of deportation proceedings.  He was in a Catch-22 situation.

The Law Court concluded that under the Ngo cases, and in spite of the decision in Padilla, post-conviction review was the petitioner’s only means of testing whether he had suffered ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant had argued that it was unclear that he could prevail on post-conviction review because the two-year statute of limitations had already run.  In a footnote, the Law Court stated that the defendant might still be able to bring such a claim on the ground of inability to have discovered the claim before the statute ran.

Justice Silver dissented, as he did in both Ngo cases, calling for the Court to give the petitioner relief from the Catch-22 by affording him an opportunity to present the merits of his position without risking the possibility that he would be barred from bringing a petition for post-conviction relief.  Unless the defendant had some way to have his constitutional claim addressed, he was at risk of having no legal recourse and of indefinitely remaining in the “unfortunate category of noncitizens who, for political reasons, are unlikely to be deported but who remain subject to deportation at any time.”  In a footnote, Justice Silver noted that the defendant’s counsel had stated at oral argument that the petitioner now “has no immigration status whatsoever.”

The Law Court affirmed this conviction for sexual contact and rejected the defendant’s single argument on appeal, that the printout of a chat between the defendant and the victim on AOL had not been properly authenticated under M.R.Evid. 901(a).  The Court reaffirmed that minimal proof is required to authenticate documents under the Rule and that a court’s approach to the issue must be flexible.  Applying these principles, the Court found that testimony by the detective who had observed the lines of chat as they appeared on the screen and who said that the printout was identical to the chat that he observed sufficiently authenticated the printout.  The Court noted that the hallmark of authentication is assurance by the witness that the evidence is a true and accurate representation of what it purports to be.  It is then for the jury to determine what weight to give the evidence because questions about the integrity of the electronic data go to its weight and not its admissibility.

In a 5-1 decision, the Law Court affirmed the imposition of sanctions of attorney fees and costs against a mortgage servicer that submitted an affidavit that was made in bad faith in support of a foreclosure summary judgment.  The affiant admitted that he did not review whether the documents said to be attached were actually attached, that he did not even read the affidavits he signed, but only the computations of the amounts owed, and that he did not execute the affidavits before a notary.  While the District Court found that his affidavit was submitted in bad faith under M.R.Civ.P. 56(h) and awarded the mortgagor her attorneys fees and costs, it declined to hold a hearing on whether the mortgage servicer should be found in contempt.

The Law Court found that these decisions were within the discretion of the trial court and pointed out that other courts in the United States had made a contempt finding under similar circumstances.  The Law Court found that the servicer’s submission of the affidavit was a reprehensible practice which displayed “a serious and alarming lack of respect for the nation’s judiciaries.”

Justice Levy dissented and would have held that, given the extreme circumstances of the case and the “severe” dishonesty associated with the preparation and notarization of the affidavit, the trial court should have, at the very least, held a hearing on contempt.

The full Law Court affirmed the findings of a single justice that the respondent probate judge had failed to dispose of judicial matters promptly, in one case holding a case under advisement for nearly five years.  The single Justice also found that there were mitigating factors and that the judge had adopted procedures to avoid such delays.  The judge also recognized the harm to the litigants and the public caused by the delays.  The Court rejected the Committee’s request that the judge be suspended without pay for one month, finding that, among other things, that would redound to the detriment of the public.

The defendant broke down the door of the victim and beat him up and was convicted of assault and aggravated criminal trespass.  The reason the defendant gave for his actions was that the victim had ostensibly threatened others by appearing on his balcony with a shotgun.  When the defendant saw him, however, the victim was, at worst, holding the shotgun so that it was not pointed at anyone or he was not even on the balcony.  The defendant’s sister was in the area and that was the basis for the competing harms defense.

The Law Court affirmed the jury’s verdict and rejected the defendant’s argument that the State had failed to disprove the existence of competing harms beyond a reasonable doubt.  It found that the State had introduced evidence supporting a finding that neither the defendant nor another person was threatened with imminent physical harm, the first of the four elements of the competing harms defense.  There was also evidence that the defendant had reasonable legal alternatives of either walking away or going into his sister’s apartment.

At his sentencing, the defendant introduced evidence from a juvenile adjudication showing that he had been counseled for anger management.  The defendant then argued that the court erred in using evidence of juvenile proceedings that were not open to the public in sentencing him.  The Law Court affirmed the sentence on the ground that the defendant had opened the door to the use of the juvenile proceedings by introducing the letter from the social worker.  He had therefore waived the protection of the statutes relating to the confidentiality of nonpublic juvenile adjudications.

This domestic case involved two members of the Somali community in Lewiston who come from two different parts of that community.  Nonetheless, the case presented the usual issues of allocation of parental responsibility and child support.

The Law Court affirmed the District Court’s findings and conclusions with regard to custody, which included a requirement that the father attempt to mediate disagreements with the assistance of elders of both communities.

The Court also upheld the District Court’s imputation to the father of earning capacity supporting a child support order.

This case involves Hannaford’s application for a site plan review permit to construct a 36,000 square foot grocery store and drive-through pharmacy in Turner.  The appellants own a parcel of land which fronts on a road which would be affected by the construction.

The Law Court affirmed the Turner Planning Board’s finding that the store would relate harmoniously and in good scale with the natural terrain and surrounding development of the area.  This is one of several criteria listed in the zoning ordinance for whether a proposed structure relates harmoniously to its surroundings.  The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the store could not relate harmoniously to its surroundings as a matter of law because it is thousands of square feet larger than the average surrounding residence.  The Court noted that the ordinance required the Board to consider eleven criteria and that this was essentially a finding of fact that would not be set aside unless there was a showing of error of law or abuse of discretion.  The Court pointed to the large administrative record as one piece of evidence that the Planning Board’s finding was supported by substantial evidence.  The Law Court also agreed with Hannaford that the building of the store would not create a “back lot” for purposes of the ordinance.

The State sought injunctive relief against the MaineHealth entities (Maine Medical Center) against its proposed merger with two major Portland-area cardiology practices.  CMMC attempted to intervene, either as of right or permissibly, but that motion was denied, although the court allowed CMMC to participate by making comments, as the public was invited to do, and taking part in oral argument.  CMMC exercised those rights but also appealed.

The Law Court denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision denying intervention.  In antitrust law, only the government is allowed to seek injunctive relief.  Private parties, however, may sue for damages.  Based on federal precedents to this effect, the Law Court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to intervene as of right and rejected the appellant’s argument that amendments to federal antitrust law made the federal precedent inapplicable.  CMMC did not assert or establish that the government had acted in bad faith, which is an exception to the rule against private parties getting involved in governmental antitrust actions.

The Law Court also affirmed the trial court’s finding that CMMC should not be permitted to intervene permissibly, agreeing with the trial court that joining a private cause of action to the State’s enforcement claim would unduly burden the proceedings and that the court had provided an alternative means by which CMMC could participate in the action through comments and oral argument.

This is a divorce case involving a great deal of money, most of which was brought to the marriage by the wife and was subject to a prenuptial agreement.  There was very little marital property to divide, but there was contentious litigation about that property.

On appeal, although the appellant raised over fifty issues, the Law Court found that only four deserved attention.  First, the Court affirmed the divorce court’s valuation of a business run by the husband because even the appellant’s own experts’ testimony support that valuation.  The Court also affirmed the valuation of a great deal of non-marital property because the parties failed to present evidence on it or the evidence was inconclusive and contradictory.

After dividing the marital property, the divorce court ordered the wife to pay the husband $300,000 to effect an “equitable distribution.”  The Law Court found this action to be beyond the court’s power because it had effectively transferred the wife’s non-marital property to the husband.  In order to effect a distribution, the divorce court may only look to the value of the marital property.  In addition, the premarital agreement prohibited the distribution of non-marital assets to the other party.

There was also a controversy about the husband keeping the wife on his health insurance.  He took her off for a brief period but was ordered to put her back on while the divorce proceeding was pending, but after the final judgment was entered, he took her off the policy permanently.  The wife asked the divorce court to enforce a preliminary injunction she had gotten when the husband had previously taken her off of the policy and to apply that injunction to his taking her off the policy after the entry of the final judgment.  The Law Court applied the rules governing the power of the divorce court to act while an appeal was pending, M.R.App.P. 3(b) and M.R.Civ.P. 62(a), and concluded that the divorce court did not have power to continue to enforce the preliminary injunction.

The divorce judgment implicitly ended the husband’s obligation to provide health insurance, and even if it did have that power, it should have denied the wife’s request because health insurance is a form of support and the divorcing couple’s premarital agreement unequivocally barred the awarding of spousal support, so that the husband could not be required to provide the wife with health insurance after the judgment was entered.

Finally, the Law Court refused to award attorney fees to the wife on the ground that “the contentiousness demonstrated by the parties’ motion practice” supported the trial court’s decision to order each party to pay his or her own fees.

This is an important case that addresses whether a person convicted of a crime must be competent in order to file and pursue a petition for post-conviction review.  The appeal was taken from a Superior Court order finding that the petitioner was incompetent to proceed with a portion of his petition for post-conviction review.

The Law Court concluded that, although the appeal was interlocutory, it nonetheless should be heard because it fell within the collateral order exception.

The Law Court determined that there was no set procedure for dealing with competence in the context of post-conviction review.  It concluded that competence is relevant to post-conviction review, however, because the convicted person has a right to counsel for that process and that right can only be given effect if the petitioner is competent.

The Court established procedures for dealing with competence on post-conviction review.  It determined that there are specific legal issues as to which the competence of the petitioner is not relevant, but for fact issues, the petitioner must be competent.  In order to deal with that issue, given the limit of one post-conviction petition and the statute of limitations of one year, the Court held that the petitioner may file a motion to reopen his post-conviction review petition after he regains his competence in order to address any new grounds for post-conviction relief that could not have been raised earlier because of the petitioner’s lack of competence.